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Impediments to Reform in European Post-Communist
Defense Institutions
Addressing the Conceptual Divide
Thomas-Durell Young
Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
This article argues two key points. First, that that Western democratic and communist defense
and military concepts are antithetical and includes an explanation of why this is the case.
Second, evidence is provided to demonstrate that legacy concepts are very much both actively
and passively evident in European post-communist defense institutions. Consequently, it is
argued that absent systematic efforts to expose and challenges the legitimacy of existing
legacy concepts (and their accompanying assumptions and institutional logic), these institu-
tions will continue to exist at best in a state of conceptual incoherence, and at worse as zombie
organizations; not dead, but certainly lacking any manifestations of life.
This article ambitiously posits that, notwithstanding consid-
erable effort by long-standing Western NATO nations, and
NATO itself, to assist post-Communist defense institutions
to reform themselves in accordance with Western defense
and military norms, the evidence from an examination of all
of these organizations suggests that transformation has been
uneven at best, a failure at worse. To be sure, no small
number of these countries have been active in providing
forces to U.S.- and NATO-led operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and many have been able to develop enviable
“niche” capabilities, such as special operations forces
(SOF). However, what one ﬁnds when examining the
defense institutions of these young democracies is not a
lack of an institutional understanding of what constitutes
basic Western defense and military concepts, but rather, how
they could be adopted into post-communist institutions.
This is readily observable in, for example, their inability to
raise and maintain viable operational formations that are ﬁt
to size and purpose. For instance, the Serbian Army has a
total number of 13,250 personnel, but is structured around
35 regular battalions. The Lithuanian Army of 3,200 sol-
diers is organized into 8 battalions. The Moldovan Army of
3,250 is organized into 5 brigades and 4 battalions.
Conversely the Belgian Army has 11,950 personnel orga-
nized into the equivalent of approximately 12 battalion-
equivalents. Bulgarian Air Force pilots can expect to ﬂy
only 30 to 40 hours per annum at best. Before the conﬂict
with Russia, their Ukrainian counterparts were averaging
around 40 hours, while NATO considers 180 hour per
annum as the minimum in order to maintain basic
proﬁciency.1 The issue at hand is not to speculate on the
optimal size of these armed forces, but rather that they
simply do not conform to basic Western military concepts,
and as such profoundly undermine their ability to undertake
even the most basic operations on a modern battleﬁeld.
In light of this troubling state of affairs, what should be of
concern to Western and Eastern ofﬁcials is that it has
occurred despite an investment of considerable resources
and attention by the old NATO nations. For instance, the
Bosnian defense budget in 2012 was approximately US
$228 million, but the Bosnian military is assessed by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies as possessing little
capability to mount combat operations. This bleak situation
has developed despite a U.S. government-sponsored $100
million train-and-equip program carried out by a private
ﬁrm with approximately 200 retired U.S. military personnel,
which was launched after the Dayton Peace Accords to
enable the new federation to defend itself.2 On a grander
scale, if one examines only one form of U.S. security assis-
tance to countries in the region from ﬁscal year 1991 to 2013
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(Title 22, International Military Education and Training,
Emergency Draw Downs, and Foreign Military Finance
Waived), the combined total is approximately $2.5 billion.3
These representative disparate data paint a picture of not only
under-funded and hollow units, but rather the inability of
defense institutions to bring themselves to make “defense”
ﬁt within their existing budgets, in order that they can pro-
duce measurable defense “outcomes.” They should also be
assessed as constituting a very poor return on Western invest-
ment. Clearly, there is an incomplete appreciation, or even
ignorance, in many of these post-communist defense institu-
tions of the need to achieve capability coherence in national
defense in accordance with Western defense norms of gov-
ernance. In its place, emotive and atavistic thinking continues
to dominate debates of how these ministries of defense and
armed forces should be managed and employed.
The question that begs to be addressed is, why has the
reform of these defense institutions been so challenging? A
review of the literature on European post-communist defense
institutions, augmented by almost 20 years of professional
experience providing advice and assistance virtually to all of
these ministries of defense and armed forces, has led the
current writer to conclude that the primary impediment to
these institutions’ adopting Western defense and military
reforms remains largely conceptual. This article will argue
that an essential lacuna in both Western and Eastern capitals
has been a systematic under-appreciation of the deeply anti-
thetical nature of Western democratic and communist author-
itarian defense and military concepts. Indeed, there has been
almost complete ignorance by ofﬁcials, both in the West and
East, of the importance of concepts, let alone their antithetical
nature, and thereby their inability to coexist within an institu-
tion. For instance, in General Philip Breedlove’s March 2016
testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the out-
going combatant commander for the European theater pre-
sented a comprehensive review of the state of security and
defense in his area of responsibility. Yet, what was missing
from his otherwise comprehensive discussion of how the
command is executing an increasing number of assistance
programs was any mention of how well-suited and prepared
the defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe are to
accept this sizeable increase in U.S. security assistance and
security cooperation funding, equipment, training, and exer-
cises in response to Russia’s growing assertiveness in
European affairs.4 In Central and Eastern Europe, the ofﬁcer
corps of the post-communist armed forces had largely not been
purged; indeed, many ofﬁcers were allowed to remain in their
posts and in some cases, rise to senior leadership positions.
Only recently have defense education and human resource
management systems been subject to growing scrutiny by
civilian ofﬁcials. As such, there should be little surprise that
old thinking and ways of doing business have remained the
norm, as opposed to the exception. Even in countries that
appear to have shaken vestiges of communist practices via
extensive deployments of formed units (e.g., Poland5 and
Slovenia6), continue to exhibit strong cases of conceptual
incoherence, as legacy concepts, assumptions, and indeed
even their institutional logic, interfere with the full adoption
of Western defense and military norms.
This article is organized to address two key issues. First, the
writer will argue that Western democratic and communist
defense and military concepts are antithetical. The purpose of
this section is to leave the reader in no doubt of the impossi-
bility of such concepts to coexist harmoniously within an
institution. Second, evidence will be presented that lends sup-
port to the article’s main thesis that such legacy concepts are
very much both actively and passively evident in European
post-communist defense institutions. In consequence of their
continued utilization, it will be argued in the conclusion that
absent systematic efforts to expose and challenge the legiti-
macy of existing legacy concepts (and their accompanying
assumptions and institutional logic), these institutions will
continue to exist at best in a state of conceptual incoherence,
and at worse as zombie-like organizations; not dead, but
certainly lacking any manifestations of life.
Two important caveats require clariﬁcation. First, it is
recognized that are three typologies of post-communism
defense institutions, i.e., post-Soviet, post-Warsaw Pact, and
post-Yugoslav, and that they possess many commonalities, as
well as some distinct differences. As such, communist defense
concepts, while arguably generally the same, there are many
variances in their intensity in their successor defense institu-
tions. Space in an article of this length does not allow for
teasing out of these differences organized in case studies; and
in consequence, there is an admittedly general treatment of
these concepts, while unique exceptions will be addressed and
explained. More detailed treatment of the unique nature of
these three typologies of communist defense organizations,
with numerous case studies, are contained in a book manu-
script shortly to be published.7 Second, and related to the ﬁrst
point, there is no generally-accepted understanding of what
constitutes “Western” defense concepts. In something as basic
as de-centralized tactical decision-making; even among
Anglo-Saxon armed forces, countries’ practices contain slight
differences and nuances.8 Commonality increasingly can be
found in the growing body of NATO doctrinal document, e.g.,
in operational planning,9 but such publications are almost
exclusively oriented toward facilitating tactical and operational
planning and execution. Some generally suggestive common-
ality in concepts will be addressed in the two tables that follow
immediately which have the added beneﬁt of being juxtaposed
with their communist conceptual counterparts.
DEFINING THE CONCEPTUAL DIVIDE
A fundamental difference between Western/NATO forces with
their communist counterparts is the basic fact that these institu-
tions are explicitly designed, organized, trained, and equipped
with the ability; and indeed expectation, to act as “thinking”
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organizations at the tactical level and to be able to undertake a
range of different missions. In contraposition, communist mod-
els andmost of their legacy armed forces; despite being highly, if
narrowly trained, were intentionally designed to be incapable of
allowing freedom of thought; and critically, freedom of action, at
the tactical level. Moreover, they were often reduced to the
strength of cadre in peacetime, thus never improving or devel-
oping. Table 1 is a general, and admittedly hardly scientiﬁcally
based table developed by the current writer as a representation of
some the key differences of howWestern and communist legacy
cultures continue to condition individuals to operate within their
respective institutions’ norms. The norms will be further deﬁned
and discussedwithin the body of this work, but at this early stage
can serve the important purpose of framing many of the issues
which contribute to produce the conceptual divide. It is not an
overstatement to observe within this context that these two
normative models and values are unquestionably antithetical.
Whereas Western ofﬁcers and soldiers are selected, educated,
trained, and utilized with the view of making them “thinking”
agents in the execution of national policy, their counterparts
continue to be plagued by communist social and organizational
norms which remain incompatible with basic liberal democratic
values. The causation for the continuation of these deeply held,
and to theWestern eye perverse, values and behaviors are likely
found in a number of explanations.
In an applied setting, the antithetical nature of the con-
ceptual divide can be vividly observed as it relates to the
differences between Western and legacy defense institutions
in the most fundamental element of any military organiza-
tion, that is, the concept of command of forces while on
operations, which is compared between these two systems
in Table 2.10 In Western practice, commanders expect their
subordinates to use critical thinking and their own initiative
to solve tactical problems, whereas in communist armed
forces commanders are expected only to execute orders
and generally never take the initiative.11 Thus, it should be
clear that communist-legacy armed forces, on a conceptual
level, could not be more different from their Western coun-
terparts. One can very easily discern the contemporary
manifestations of directed command essentially within all
successor legacy-defense institutions.
It is for this reason that Table 3 is used to establish in a
graphic generalization of the different conceptual approaches of
the three legacy defense institutions laid across the areas of
analysis, with a generic representation of NATO countries, all
circa 1989. What the matrix demonstrates is three critically
important points. First, it displays in stark terms the differences
among the three typologies of communist defense institutions
and should make the point of their differences. That said, while
they share many institutional pathologies, due to their difference
provenance, their subsequent manifestations vary. Second, the
chart should give pause to those Western ofﬁcials who have the
task of working cooperatively with these civil defense institu-
tions and armed forces with the objective of integrating them
into allied military structures, particularly as regards to improv-
ing their ability to achieve interoperability with NATO nations.
To be sure, NATO has become more sophisticated over the
years and now differentiates among the various levels of
“interoperability.”13 However nuanced these deﬁnitions might
be, major conceptual impediments stand in the way of making
progress. Third, in its most primary form, the challenge of
effecting closer interoperability is clearly conceptual; and there-
fore, constitutes fundamental obstacles to achieving interoper-
ability with Western armed forces. As these impediments are
conceptual in nature, they will not be solved employing a purely
technical, equipment, or training approach. This was recognized
some years ago by David Glanz:
The term interoperability itself has numerous facets and is
still ill deﬁned. Nevertheless, at a minimum it involves the
ability of national forces to operate effectively with NATO
TABLE 1
The Military Conceptual Divide
Western norms Legacy norms
● Practical ● Theoretical
● Decentralized execution ● Centralized execution
● Commanders are empowered ● Commanders only execute
● Results oriented ● Process oriented
● Low social context ● High social context
● Serve the troops ● Mistreat soldiers
● Low power distance ● High power distance
● Low uncertainty avoidance ● High uncertainty avoidance
● Lying is unacceptable ● Lying is not a sin
● Failure is precious
opportunity to learn
● Failure is never an option, but shame
and disgrace
TABLE 2
Understanding Western and Communist Legacy Command
Concepts
Mission Command Versus Detailed Command
Unpredictable Assumes war is Predictable
Disorder/uncertainty Accepts Order/Certainty



















Ad hoc types fostered Bureaucratic
Delegate Leadership styles Disempower and Direct
Art of war Appropriate to Science of war12
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forces, to be able to assume their NATO-assigned staff
responsibilities, and most important, but less recognized, to
understand and implement Western military concepts. 14
EVIDENCE OF THE CONCEPTUAL DIVIDE
The universally pernicious nature of communism did tend to
produce common characteristics that have impeded an
appreciation and adoption of Western defense military
norms. To be sure, they vary by country where they are
manifested, as well as in their intensity. That said, their
representation in this section will serve to support a con-
textual understanding that provides a basis against which the
following section can assess and critique the West’s
approach to providing reform assistance, and particularly
the policy assumptions upon which that have guided their
programs. As will be argued, the delta between Western
assumptions and Central and Eastern European institutional,
conceptual, and cultural realities is quite wide and deep, and
they begin from ﬁrst principles.
Highly Centralized Decision-making
If there is one communist-legacy concept that continues to
be followed throughout these defense institutions, often
without any questioning, it is the debilitating centralization
of all decision-making. In effect, no decision is too small
not to be passed not just to higher command, but literally to
the minister of defense and his political team, and even to
the President; albeit in the case of, for example, Poland,
progress has been made to clarify and expand the ministry
of defense’s responsibilities for the command of the armed
forces.15 For instance, in the Bulgarian defense institution,
all invoices, and even travel vouchers, must be approved at
the deputy ministerial level. With an unbroken line tracing
back to communist rule, the speciﬁc authorities invested in
political leadership and military command are generally not
deﬁned by law or regulation, but rather are simply equated
to constituting unbridled power over all subordinates. Even
in more reformed communist-legacy defense institutions,
centralization tendencies persist; for example, the Polish
chief of defense (CHOD) is named “ﬁrst soldier”
(Pierwszy Zolnierz RP). A critically important implication
(or rather the cause) of the continued use of this concept is
that ﬁnancial decision-making essentially is universally cen-
tralized in ministries of defense. As a result, capability
providers, for example, chiefs of services, do not possess
budgets, nor do they often have authority over determining
the number of personnel they require, and enjoy little under-
standing and support from the ministry of defense even
among the retired ofﬁcer cadre serving as defense ofﬁcials.
For instance, in seemingly reformed Slovenia, the CHOD
controls no more than 5 percent of his own budget, and the
mid-term defense program is so restrictive as to limit the
ability of battalion commanders to manage their units’
ﬁnances to meet their assigned missions and tasks.16
Debilitating centralization can also be found in the all but
universal practice of general staffs continuing to claim
authority over tactical-level responsibilities, such as train-
ing, which are performed at the expense of providing sup-
port to the ministry of defense in executing national-level
policies and priorities—where they have been determined,
that is.
Absence of Critical Thinking
As a corollary of the concept of centralization of decision-
making, the concept that strength and military success can
only ﬂow from iron and blind discipline has yet to be
discredited and retired. Only the most senior leaders are
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allowed to engage in critical thinking, as an essential ele-
ment of their professional responsibilities. David Glanz’s
observations made in 1998 are as true then as they are
now, “In fact, in addition to the other military legacies of
communist rule, because of its pervasiveness, persistence,
and intangible nature, the intellectual legacy of Soviet rule
may prove to be the most difﬁcult problem in the military to
overcome.17 Yet, if one becomes a commander of an armed
force, but has never been allowed to engage in critical
thinking during one’s entire professional career, its advent
late in one’s professional life is unlikely to prove successful.
As critical thinking is all but not taught in unreformed and
largely “civilianized” professional military education (PME)
institutions (where rote and passive “learning” remains the
norm),18 it is little wonder that most staff work in these
countries is highly underdeveloped and lacks such basic key
characteristics as problem-deﬁnition, objectivity, trade-off
analysis based on data, and the development of actionable
courses of action. With some exceptions, one can ﬁnd this
weakness at all levels in all legacy defense institutions.
What is maddening is that many Central and Eastern
European ofﬁcers have been trained and educated in
Western PME institutions; and critically, many more have
been on demanding international operations (e.g., Iraq,
Afghanistan, and UN peacekeeping operations). On opera-
tions and international exercises, these individuals will
demonstrate remarkable ﬂuency in their ability to engage
in critically analyzing the operational environment.
However, once returned to his or her national environment,
these tools are quietly packed away and legacy concepts
once again are followed. For example, notwithstanding the
long record of Polish deployments, ofﬁcial sociological
studies have found that soldiers do not feel that they are
fully part of decision-making, and the Romanian armed
forces struggle to enable the delegation of authority and
improve information ﬂow.19
Algorithmic Approach to Problem Solving
An additional corollary of the systematic discouragement of
being allowed to engage in critical thinking is the primacy
of employing the algorithmic approach to solving all pro-
blems. In essence, this holds that there is one “scientiﬁcally”
based solution (expressed mathematically) to all defense
planning and management problems.20 This fallacious con-
cept has its roots in legacy norms that ofﬁcials (unless they
are senior Party ofﬁcials) were never to be trusted to make
any decisions. As so vividly and bloodily demonstrated by
the Soviet Red Army in the Second World War, operational
planning analysis consisted of the accurate application of
the correct correlation of forces algorithm to produce the
one, scientiﬁcally determined, solution to an operational
move.21 After the Cold War, this legacy approach to opera-
tional planning by the armed force has even been elevated to
providing a conceptual basis for national-level defense
planning in many countries, including Ukraine.22 This
legacy concept is closely related to; and feeds into, another
legacy norm, that being escaping from the responsibility and
accountability of one’s own professional actions. Soviet
ideology was based on the premise that solutions were
scientiﬁcally derived, and therefore, perfect. Ergo, by deﬁ-
nition, a scientiﬁcally developed algorithm was ﬂawless,
and therefore any sub-performance could be blamed on an
individual who did not understand, or did not applied fully
the algorithm, “science,” or communist ideology.
Undeveloped Defense Planning
In its most generic sense, Western defense planning is
based on the concept that frames questions, which once
accomplished, can only be solved using human factors—
argument, civil-military collaboration, and consensus-build-
ing—to develop a range of possible solutions. Yet, as a
direct result of the continued use of communist-legacy
concepts, all these institutions, to varying degrees of inten-
sity, are simply all but incapable of consistently conducting
rudimentary defense planning. Notwithstanding early opti-
mistic and highly well-informed assessments that a number
of legacy defense institutions were capable of conducting
effective defense planning (e.g., Slovakia),23 subsequent
performance has demonstrated that conducting effective
planning (vice producing ﬁnancially unrealizable plans)
remains elusive at best. To be sure, all of these ministries
of defense have directorates of “defense planning,” and
they all draft “defense plans.” However, it is difﬁcult to
identify where any of these plans actually have system-
atically changed the allocation of money, personnel distri-
bution, or adjusted structures and what good results were
achieved for the money spent throughout all these years of
transition?
There are two telling examples of systematic planning
failures in these post-Communist defense institutions.
First, the Slovak Ministry of Defense publicly acknowl-
edged in 2013 that the armed forces personnel structure
was seriously unbalanced, 70 percent of its ground equip-
ment was past its life-cycle, and it could reach only 54
percent of NATO standards to achieve interoperability.
The minister went on to acknowledge that this poor
state of affairs placed in serious doubt the armed force’s
ability to defend the country, let alone meeting its inter-
national commitments.24 Second, following the develop-
ment by the Estonian Ministry of Defense of its National
Defence Development Plan, 2013–2022,25 the National
Audit Ofﬁce analyzed the plan in a critical light. While
lengthy, the key negative ﬁndings of its report need to be
cited in full as they represent a revealing view of the state
of underdevelopment of planning and budgeting, which
must be balanced by the perception among some Western
ofﬁcials that Estonia is managing its defense institution
rather well:
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● “Acting for the purpose of attaining the desired
defence capacity has not been systematically managed.
● “There were no realistic long-term goals, agreed prio-
rities or approved long-term procurement plans for
planning and procuring material resources.
● “The Minister of Defence and the Commander of the
Defence Forces did not have an up-to-date overview of
the situation of wartime units for a long period of time.
● “The Defence Forces are unaware of the extent of the
civil resources they can count on.”26
From a wider Western perspective, these reports should
open some eyes, particularly in NATO nations’ capitals, as
to the depth of the problem.
Too often, Western ofﬁcials see what they recognize as
comparable organizational structures and documents and
simply assume that their activities and outputs are com-
parable to their Western counterparts.27 Maddeningly,
planning directorates do indeed produce “plans,” but
they are almost always denuded of priorities, nor are
they deﬁned by their ﬁnancial costs, let alone sufﬁciently
informed by operational planning analysis (e.g., even in
advanced Slovenia).28 As such, they are almost always
simply aspirations, and not plans. As a reﬂection of their
legacy heritage and positive-law systems, legacy defense
ofﬁcials deﬁne plans as contracts (with the parliament,
the latter being duty-bound to provide the money, as
shown in the plan). There is little institutional acceptance
of the need for ﬂexibility to enable the basic tenants of
plans to stay current in light of expected shifts in policies
and ﬁnancial realities. Equally, plans are seen as inadap-
table after their approval, and indeed, they very often
become enshrined in law, for example, the Ukrainian
Five-Year Development Plans of the Armed Forces.29 In
short, defense plans resemble Soviet-inspired rigid opera-
tional plans which are often translated into uncosted, or
inaccurately costed, development plans. That such a per-
nicious legacy persists more than 25 years since the end
of the Cold War clearly manifests a widespread debilitat-
ing institutional incapability to undertake such a critically
essential national-level task. Within a Western normative
context, of course, the task of defense planning, from its
ﬁrst principles, must be to make defense “ﬁt” the existing
and envisaged defense budget. This line of argument
contradicts assertions one almost always hears in legacy
defense institutions that reform can only occur with addi-
tional funding. The evidence demonstrates that unrealiz-
able national defense plans are still being produced
throughout the region must be judged as one of the
most serious challenges to these institutions and constitu-
tes a major failure in Western provided advice and assis-
tance. That more Western ofﬁcials are not aware of, and
animated by, this fundamental weakness is nothing short
of surprising.
Restrictive Interpretation of Positive Law
Post-communist positive law (i.e., Civil Code) has had a
highly negative affect on the ability, or perhaps willing-
ness, of ofﬁcials to engage in critical thinking. Actions
are allowed only insofar as they are explicitly sanctioned
in law. As such, all activities and authorities are narrowly
deﬁned and the delegation of authority is highly
restricted. This approach only encourages the further cen-
tralization of decision-making and produces an environ-
ment that forbids activity unless it is explicitly allowed in
law. Not surprisingly, this becomes a very convenient
excuse for many not to lead, let alone take calculated
risks to press for change. In consequence, the inability
of ministries of defense to take an active and dynamic
role in interpreting the basic foundations for policy—i.e.,
the Constitution and Defense Acts—tends to result in
policy needing to be expressed as legislation, as opposed
to being interpreted and articulated in policy memoranda,
or regulations. Thus, policy is conﬂated as law which has
the detrimental effect of impeding, as opposed to facil-
itating, needed change. Worse yet, if it is assumed that
policy must be expressed in detailed legislation. Even
something as basic as “defense planning,” can result in
a stand-alone piece of legislation (of 20+ pages in length)
written by a non-defense planning expert in a very restric-
tive manner (e.g., Georgia and Romania).30 In short, the
conﬂation of law and policy has been a major impediment
to enabling governments and ministers of defense
throughout the region from making even the most basic
of conceptual reforms.
Ergo: The Absence of Policy Framework
As a result of all of these factors, policy frameworks, even
where they exist, are weak. As Edmunds, Cottey, and Forster
postulated in 2006, one of the most signiﬁcant challenges
facing reforming defense institutions in Central and Eastern
Europe is the “distinct problem of establishing effective con-
trol over defence policy.”31 In effect, institutional and indivi-
dual thinking remains mired in deﬁning “policy” either as out
of bounds as within the realm of partisan political life (i.e.,
politika), or simply to be provided by “military” ofﬁcials (via
“doktrina”; see below).32 Consequently, existing policy direc-
tion and priorities remain a function of personal relationships
and a decision-making process often built on personal power,
as opposed to speciﬁed and deﬁned authorities, balanced by
individual accountability. Thus, it is common to ﬁnd published
“policy” documents which are completely and utterly ignored
by the bureaucracy, since they are rarely connected to ﬁnancial
decision-making. In fact, it is equally not uncommon that such
documents are so general as to be useless to planners,33 or
hopelessly out-of-date, thereby providing a visible apprecia-
tion of the state of underdeveloped policy frameworks, dis-
connected from resource decision-making. The inability of a
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ministry of defense either to promulgate policy that directs
every action of the organization, let alone ensuring that its
policies and priorities are executed, simply is not fully func-
tioning as deﬁned byWestern concepts of defense governance.
For without such a capability, legacy practices and even basic
military activities and practices continue unhindered. For
instance, absent ministerial-sanctioned contingency planning
guidance, it should come to be no surprise that these armed
forces continue to be oriented to, and trained in accordance
with, legacy concepts, assumptions, and standards. For
instance, the Slovenian Ministry of Defense has yet to adopt
the practice of placing threats in priority order in its planning
documents.34
In lieu of policy, one can ﬁnd either full-blown versions,
or not so subtle hints, of the communist practice of estab-
lishing the entire conceptual raison d’être of the armed
forces by “scientiﬁcally” developing voennaia doktrina, or
“military doctrine.” This nomenclature has led to no end of
confusion for Western ofﬁcials and analysts, as this legacy
conceptual foundation document has nothing to do with the
Western concept of its purpose and is completely different
from the Western concept of doctrine per se. The former
documents are developed employing the most exacting
“scientiﬁc” standards to produce the one document that
addresses all aspects of military affairs. From strategy to
tactics, military doctrine encapsulates all that was needed to
be known, while forever reinforcing the concept of total
centralization of control. There was never a question of
anyone having the authority to interpret doktrina, or that it
might contain shortcomings. Its characteristics then can best
be thought of as being not philosophical, but rather theolo-
gical in nature, reinforced by its status as having the force of
law: it is transgressed at one’s personal peril (as in
Moldova).35 Notwithstanding efforts to reform the defense
institution to adopt Western defense and military norms the
better to be able to respond militarily to Russian aggression,
the Ukrainian government endorsed a new version of its
military doctrine in September 2015.36
Unclear Institutional Roles/Missions
Directly related to the issue of a lack of a policy framework is
the absence of clarity in institutional responsibilities, which is
often due to contradictory legislation. To be sure, this issue
varies in intensity from country-to-country; yet, as “roles and
missions” remain regularly contested, and essential subsidiary
concepts, such as command authorities, are still unknown,
let alone deﬁned. For instance, David Darchiashvili documents
the contradictory nature of Georgian defense and security-
related policy documents and legislation in such critical areas
as who can declare a state of emergency (with or without
parliamentary approval) and the basic roles and missions of
the armed forces, let alone possessing legislation sufﬁciently
ﬂexible to coordinate between the Ministry of Defense and the
General Staff.37 As remarkable as it may seem, notwithstanding
their respective positive-law traditions, there remains great con-
fusion and opacity of the roles and missions of all ministries,
let alone within defense institutions themselves. The practice—
or perhaps one should say “culture” —of coordination and
consensus-building ranges from underdeveloped to nonexistent,
which only compounds the need to establish clarity in institu-
tional responsibilities. Such an endeavor, without doubt, takes
on addedmeaningwhen one considers that most countries in the
region possess paramilitary forces with law-enforcement as well
as national-defense responsibilities in wartime. It is not always
clear in most of these countries how these organizations would
function in an international crisis. The confusion surrounding
Georgian government actions in the Georgia–Russia War of
2008,38 Russian ofﬁcials’ response to the Beslan hostage crisis
in September 2004, 39 and the lack of a coherent Ukrainian
response to the Russian invasion of Crimea and support of
armed separatists in eastern Ukraine in 2014 provide chillingly
representative examples. From a traditional Western perspec-
tive, the concept of each discrete role can only be led by one
organization and others are in support, as well as a basic under-
standing of the concept of escalation, are only slowly being
accepted. Finally, the concept of “transfer of authority,”whereby
formal, structured, tested, and validated procedures that allow
the lead for speciﬁc responsibilities to transition through escala-
tion, is equally unknown as an essential concept, both for
national defense, but also for effective response to national
disasters.
Inadequate Force Management and Development
The basic Western conceptual building blocks of force
management and force development remain alien in the
Central and Eastern European region and either simply are
not formally conducted or are in their most basic embryonic
state. In simple terms, force management is deﬁned as that
activity conducted by the defense institution that endeavors
actively to maintain required capabilities to determined
standards of performance. With the possible exceptions of
Poland, Slovenia, and Romania, ministries of defense and
general staffs in the region appear blindly unaware of the
essential need for the daily and systematic management of
the force in its entirety. Since the requirement for force
management has gone largely ignored, it is little wonder
that force development, which logically should build on the
continuous examination of the capabilities of the current
force in relation to government guidance, is equally under-
developed. Hence, the lack of viable procurement programs
should not be attributed solely to the lingering effects of the
2008 ﬁnancial crisis, but rather it also exposes ﬂaws in how
these defense institutions continue to waste precious and
limited ﬁnances on outdated weapon systems and excess
infrastructure (e.g., educational institutions). A senior
Slovak defense ofﬁcial claimed the 10-year defense plan
(i.e., Force 2010) would secure policy objectives by directly
linking them to capabilities in a system that had yet fully to
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internalize the full conceptual meaning of capabilities,
let alone fully to embrace key Western defense concepts.40
“Capabilities”
Directly related to the lack of force-management and force
development concepts is that conceptual defense thinking in
the region remains largely tied tightly to legacy concepts of
“systems” and “platforms,” instead of “capabilities.”
Platforms and systems are seen as discrete items, concep-
tually detached from integrative training and logistics, all to
create synergies with other systems and produce measurable
effects; that is, capabilities. As a planning building-block,
capabilities remain all but unknown in most legacy defense
institutions, not the least of which since many Slavic lan-
guages do not possess a distinct word for “capability.”41
Moreover, as there has been very little defense procurement
of sizable Western kit, due to the lack of policy-driven
planning and force-development processes, the mere experi-
ence of procuring and then maintaining a major Western-
source capability has yet to have been experienced ﬁrst-
hand by many of these defense institutions. Those that
have procured/obtained a critical mass of Western equip-
ment (e.g., Poland with F-16sC/D Block 52s, FFG-7 fri-
gates, Type 209 submarines, and Leopard main battle tanks)
have experienced a profound shock to their entire defense
institutions, whose implications are still being absorbed.
That said, a strong argument can be made that in the case
of the acquisition of Polish F-16, although introduced in
2006, these aircraft only became operational in 2012.42
Moreover, Polish defense ofﬁcials still struggle to employ
this capability using Western concepts as witnessed by the
fact that of the ﬁve deployments made by the Polish Air
Force in support of the NATO Baltic Air Policing operation,
not one of these has yet to be comprised of F-16s, but rather
have been undertaken by its MiG-29s,43 despite the fact that
the latter are ostensibly more expensive to operate.44
Weak Defense Civilian Cadre
With one notable exception (the Yugoslav republics’ territor-
ial defense commands), communist armed forces simply did
not have civilian defense experts or ofﬁcials. The defense
institutions were thoroughly militarized as there was no per-
ceived need for a cadre of civilian “defense,” as opposed to
military, experts to provide that necessary objective policy
continuity and act as a conduit between senior political
ofﬁcials and the armed forces. The introduction of democratic
governments in these countries quickly changed the civil–
military relationship and this gap was quickly ﬁlled either by
posting active duty ofﬁcers, retired military ofﬁcers, or inex-
perienced civilians to ministries of defense. In many coun-
tries, active duty and retired ofﬁcers were and continue to be
widely posted to ministries of defense, notwithstanding their
having precious little understanding of the modern
democratic concept of civil–military relations, rendering the
civilian defense cadre conceptually handicapped by legacy
concepts and norms. The result of this dearth in the quality
and quantity of civilian expertise has been the continuation of
a military orientation of defense institutions that has only
begun to diminish, but not in all countries.45 In fact, one
can make a strong argument that the lack of a cadre of
experienced civilian defense ofﬁcials has, among other
things, impeded the development of a policy framework.
False Cognates
A ﬁnal element of the division that continues to inhibit better
mutual understanding between Western and legacy minds is
the challenge posed by language. Whereas differentiation in
concepts and principles is, at times, obvious, less understood is
the impediment of language to achieving greater intellectual
interoperability. Given that lexica exist to convey conceptual
meaning, it is a tricky challenge to be able to convey the true
meaning of a basic Western military concept when partners’
languages either have no direct equivalent word or, worse yet,
there exist false cognates, or the concept is simply unknown.46
As seen in the case of policy and doctrine, false cognates are
essentially omnipresent in discussions and communications
between Western and legacy defense institutions, and are
rarely rectiﬁed. Even basic deﬁnitions (i.e., battalions, war-
ships, and combat aircraft) present challenges, as in most
legacy defense institutions, these terms have different mean-
ings from their Western usage. In the Western context, a
generic “infantry battalion” consists of +/– 600 soldiers and
ofﬁcers who have been through a full regime of individual,
collective, and leadership training, with sufﬁcient fuel, practice
ammunition, a formal annual training cycle, exercise program,
and so forth, all of which builds habitual relationships with
combat support, and combat service support, formations.
Anything less than all of these elements degrades its ability
to be operational and suitable for deployment. In the minds of
still too many legacy ofﬁcers, a bona ﬁde infantry battalion can
consist of only 20 percent of its authorized manpower and
conduct little or no collective training, exercises can be episo-
dic and “canned,” and with only minor interactions with com-
bat support and service support formations. To the Western
mind, an infantry battalion needs these enabling components
in order to qualify as a “capability,” whereas in a legacy
environment, whatever has been determined by senior ofﬁcials
constitutes a universal truth.
WHY THE CONCEPTUAL DIVIDE PERSISTS
While the evidence is strong that legacy defense institutions
struggle to overcome their communist inherences, an expla-
nation as to why these concepts continue to be found
throughout the region, despite the ostensible adoption of
Western democratic norms and values, arguably is twofold.
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The ﬁrst relates to the antithetical nature of Western and
communist defense and military concepts. The second is a
function of the fact that Western policy of providing advice
and assistance continues to underestimate the challenge of
transforming these defense institutions due to a lack of
appreciation of the strong role played by culture.
As regards the ﬁrst point, the West made a fundamental
error of determining that the best means of engaging with its
former enemies was via the use of military diplomacy, rather
than basing it on professional military honesty, in the devel-
opment of relationships with these communist armed forces.
Thus, the policy choice of deliberately designing condition-
speciﬁc policies to assist these organizations to undertake
the necessary painful reforms to adopt in order to become a
defense institution in a democracy was sacriﬁced for the
nebulous objective of “relationship-building,” dubiously
based on the principles of mutual respect and equality. At
the heart of the matter, the West’s approach, perhaps not
even intentionally, was founded on the erroneous premise,
so presciently described by Clemmesen and Ulrich, of the
existence of a commonality in their respective deﬁnitions of
military professionalism.47 As communist governance is
loyalty-based, while the governance in Western democracies
is merit-based (exceptions aside), it is obvious that profes-
sionalism in both is based on completely different sets of
values, limiting both worlds to communication with
mutually false cognates. As such, the general approach to
providing advice and assistance has been founded on the
principles that existing security assistance and security
cooperation programs, with minor adjustment,48 were suita-
ble to supporting reform. In effect, Western armed forces
were largely delegated the lead in deﬁning requirements and
providing advice and assistance. It should not be surprising,
therefore, that these institutions deﬁned the problem as
militarily technical (and not political and cultural-depen-
dent), to be addressed with training, speciﬁcally at the
tactical level. That institutional reform implies concurrent
institutional destruction and recognition of its inherent poli-
tical nature are realities that have largely been avoided.
Fundamentally, Western ofﬁcials have grossly underesti-
mated the deep and pernicious roots of communist concepts.
Equally long underappreciated has been the fact that as
Western and legacy concepts are antithetical in nature, by
deﬁnition, they cannot coexist in a functional sense (i.e. they
cannot co-function) in an organization. Hence, one ﬁnds
littered throughout legacy defense institutions a plethora of
Western concepts, models, and processes that have been
ostensibly adopted. In reality, upon examination, what one
often ﬁnds is that these Western “gifts” have been laid atop
their corresponding legacy concepts like stickers, labels or
banners. As they are antithetical, the results have been to
degrade the ability of these organizations to function effec-
tively either as legacy or as Western-oriented defense insti-
tutions. This has resulted in creating “conceptual spaghetti”
(see Figure 1). A representative example of this condition
can be found in the experience of the Serbian Ministry of
Defense’s introduction of programming budgeting, which
was implemented by integrating the method into the legacy
ﬁnancial-management system, and consequently, has yet to
function as envisaged.49
Apropos the issue of culture, one would be well advised
never to underestimate its overwhelming inﬂuence mani-
fested in governance, particularly in the context of “nations”
that have been long dominated and suppressed by foreign
powers and where national institutions have been able to
develop a high degree of resiliency to exogenous pressures
as an essential mechanism for survival. In the particular case
of Central and Eastern Europe, it is clear that most of these
societies continue to struggle to overcome their recent his-
torical experience of communism where a culture of distrust
was pervasive. It is little wonder that despite some 25 years
since the fall of communism, Branko Milanovic calculates
that only 10 percent of the population of these countries
have experienced economic prosperity greater than they
enjoyed at independence. These failed transitions have
resulted in messy politics and ineffectual governance.50
There is little evidence to support the contention that
Western ofﬁcials even today have determined the need to
gain a greater understanding of the cultural conditions as
they affect defense of the countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, thereby better informing Western policy and deci-
sion-making. This is unfortunate, as such an understanding is
so clearly needed. For solely illustrative purposes, Geert
Hofstede is one among many experts who have developed
methods by which one can study the difference between and
among cultures.51 There are other methods to be sure, but a
brief review of some of the data discerned by Hofstede’s
research can be used simply to illustrate the variance of key
cultural norms between Western nations and their counter-
parts in Central and Eastern Europe. To be sure, countries in
this region are hardly homogenous, but those variations argue
still for a more informed and nuanced understanding of those
key cultural norms. As incomplete as the Hofstede data are, a
review of these data in Annex A reveals some useful insights
FIGURE 1 Conceptual “Spaghetti”.
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of the degree to whichWestern and Eastern cultural norms are
signiﬁcantly dissimilar (data for the United States are pre-
sented for comparative purposes). If one only reviews two
cultural variables— power distance52 and uncertainty
avoidance53—insight can be quickly gleaned.
First, if some Western societies (e.g., Anglo-Saxon and
Nordic countries) can be typiﬁed as having “low” power
distances, those in the East (particularly after the experience
of communism) conversely have generally a “high” degree
of power distance (i.e., Bulgaria, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia). To support this
line of argument, in the case of Slovakia, where power
distance is scored to be at a maximum high of 100, a report
by a Slovak think tank advocated the need for regular
consultations between the president and the CHOD, as
well as the minister of defense’s collegium to enable more
informed decision-making.54 In other words, power remains
centralized at the top of an organization and delegation of
authority is rarely allowed, and this is not seen, culturally, as
constituting a problem. This has direct applicability for
defense institutions in many ways. Western-style mission-
command and military decision-making processes (the foun-
dation stones on which liberal democratic military concepts
and assumptions are based) are incomprehensible to legacy
ofﬁcers and soldiers within their respective national con-
texts. Moreover, hardly extant, and in some cases nonexis-
tent, “force-management” practices can be explained by the
fact that force management requires an ongoing institutional
dialogue with those in tactical formations accurately report-
ing problems, proposing solutions, and arguing require-
ments, where truth must be spoken to power. Finally as
regards this reality, in cultures with high power distance,
only the most carefully reviewed and considered advice and
assistance programs should be considered that wish to intro-
duce concepts that necessitate devolution of power and
authority, for example, introduction of professional non-
commissioned ofﬁcers.
Second, Hofstede’s other highly relevant cultural charac-
teristic is uncertainty avoidance. Cultures with a high inci-
dence of this norm are the three Baltic states, Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Croatia,
Serbia, and Slovenia. In these cultures, individuals are
self-limiting when confronted with challenges outside a
societal norm, out of fear of losing status and stature within
society. Thus, problem-solving on one’s own initiative,
which would be a self-evident task in Western armed forces,
will be difﬁcult to encourage out of fear by individuals of
unknown outcomes coming from “above.”
The purpose of examining these data is not to make
sweeping or broad generalizations that hold for all cases.
Rather, the point is that these data show some signiﬁcant
societal and cultural divergences between Western and
Central/Eastern European cultures that make adopting
Western defense and military concepts a serious challenge.
Where the data establish clear differences speaks to the need
for a deeper understanding of the culture of each particular
country. It should be clear that the successful transition by
legacy armed forces based on Western concepts and
assumptions would be greatly enhanced with a full under-
standing of, among other things, how to overcome, or
perhaps even co-opt, these ingrained cultural traits.
One should also note that there is an extensive literature
on a variety of subjects that relate directly to providing a
greater understanding of culture to the diffusion of military
innovation, not to mention useful insights that can be
gleaned from studies of strategic culture.55 A recent com-
pendium systematically presents a series of case studies to
ascertain the conditions on which military innovation can be
transmitted. In brief, the contributors agree that “The pro-
cess of diffusion appears far less deterministic and much
more vulnerable to local conditions than the system view
suggests.” Organizational research also demonstrates that
the adoption and implementation of foreign models is
challenging.56 Historical research reveals no clear explana-
tion of why the diffusion of military innovation and tech-
nology was successful in some countries and periods (e.g.,
Meiji Japan), yet failed in others (e.g., nineteenth-century
Ottoman Empire). “These puzzles demonstrate the contin-
gent nature of the diffusion process and suggest the need to
search for factors that explain the remarkably wide-range of
responses to innovation across societies, organizations, cul-
tures, contexts, and historical epochs.”57 Critically,
Goldman and Eliason argue:
A concerted effort to broaden and deepen “intellectual inter-
operability” within the context of NATO and other institu-
tions of the growing democratic security community, while
beneﬁcial, may require ﬁnding common ground culturally as
well as politically and militarily.58
To conclude this section, a strong case can be made that
only by deﬁning the problem differently will Western efforts
be capable of understanding and addressing the antithetical
nature of persistent and pernicious communist legacy con-
cepts, defense planning assumptions, and logic. It is solely
on the basis of such an improved understanding that gov-
ernments in the region can be enabled to develop solutions
that effectively replace their inherited communist concepts
with a nuanced understanding of liberal democratic–derived
concepts of defense governance. By extension, it is essential
for all donor NATO nations to change their own policies,
concepts, assumptions, programs, and indeed institutional
logic, when designing and managing reform projects in
allied/partners’ defense institutions. This is essential, as
previous experience over the past 25 years demonstrates
that existing Western policies have not worked particularly
well. Furthermore, this suggested new approach arguably
could be applicable to the whole process of transformation
that is at the core of NATO as an organization and of
defense change management in each of its member states.
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CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the investment of considerable Western
resources and legacy governments’ political capital, the
transformation of post-communist defense institutions
remains very much a work in progress, even after +/–25
years. The results of this uneven evolution of reform has
been incapable of preventing a growing dysfunctionality in
the region’s defense institutions at worst (arguably Slovakia
by its own public admission)59 and underperforming ones at
best (e.g., Poland, Slovenia, and Romania). The continued
presence of communist-legacy platforms and systems in
these armed forces, coupled with their inability to divest
themselves of legacy concepts, assumptions, and indeed
institutional logic, has produced, to varying degrees, cap-
ability incoherence. This essay has argued that causation for
this inability to adopt Western defense and military concepts
has been the failure by both Western and Eastern ofﬁcials to
recognize the dominating role that continues to be played by
the persistence of communist-legacy concepts imbedded in
these defense institutions. Albeit hardly exhaustive, the list
of concepts that continue to dominate the functioning of
these organizations are the centralization of decision-mak-
ing, an absence of critical thinking, an algorithmic approach
to problem solving, underdeveloped defense planning cap-
abilities, a restrictive interpretation of positive law, the
absence of policy frameworks, unclear institutional roles
and missions, inadequate force management/development,
difﬁculty deﬁning defense outcomes as constituting capabil-
ities, a weak civilian defense cadre, and conceptual false
cognates.
Despite the investment of considerable Western resources
and political capital by some reforming Eastern ofﬁcials,
communist-legacy military concepts continue to provide
much of the “intellectual software” that operates these
defense institutions. While Eastern politicians and ofﬁcials
can be faulted for not consistently endeavoring to root out
and retire legacy concepts and assumptions with the objec-
tive of changing the operating logic of these organizations,
Western ofﬁcials must also come under criticism. There has
been very little effort to optimize policy by donor nations—
indeed including the NATO International Staff and allied
commands—by recognizing the continued widespread exis-
tence of communist concepts and the need to develop
engagement methods that at least control for, and at best
overcome, the existence of these obstacles to these coun-
tries’ adopting Western defense and military concepts. This
must become the preferred means of advising and providing
assistance to these defense institutions as opposed simply to
encouraging them superﬁcially to lay new concepts on top
of their legacy counterparts.
But let there be no mistake that both Western and parti-
cularly Eastern politicians and ofﬁcials need quickly to
come to terms with accepting that democratic and commu-
nist defense and military concepts are inherently antithetical.
There is an immediate need for the development of country-
and culturally aware methods and means to assist these
countries systematically to identify communist-legacy con-
cepts, create policies to exculpate them from the institution,
and adapt Western concepts optimally suited to their condi-
tions and requirements, so as to avoid producing yet more
conceptual spaghetti. Albert Einstein presciently observed
that the deﬁnition of insanity is doing the same thing repeti-
tively while expecting different results. Unless Western
ofﬁcials recognize the depth of the problem at hand, it is
dangerously close to ﬁtting this troubling diagnosis.
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ANNEX A
Cultural Tools and Country Comparisons
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Ukraine Bulgaria
Czech
Rep. Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Croatia Serbia Slovenia U.S.
Power distance 40 44 42 92 63 49 38 61 85 100 73 86 73 40
Individualism 60 70 60 25 28 61 87 64 28 54 33 25 27 91
Masculinity 30 9 19 27 39 58 92 66 41 100 40 43 19 62
Uncertainty
avoidance
60 63 65 95 74 63 71 82 79 41 80 92 88 46
Pragmatism 82 69 82 55 72 73 60 31 53 81 58 52 49 26
Indulgence 16 13 16 18 16 29 31 29 20 28 33 28 48 68
Missing from the database: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro.
Source: The Hofstede Centre, http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html.
Deﬁnitions:
Power distance: This dimension deals with the fact that all individuals in societies are not equal – it expresses the attitude of the culture towards these
inequalities amongst us. Power distance is deﬁned as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect
and accept that power is distributed unequally
Individualism: The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its members. It has to do
with whether people’s self-image is deﬁned in terms of “I” or “We”. In Individualist societies people are supposed to look after themselves and their direct
family only. In Collectivist societies, people belong to ‘in groups’ that take care of them in exchange for loyalty.
Masculinity: A high score (masculine) on this dimension indicates that the society will be driven by competition, achievement and success, with success
being deﬁned by the winner/best in ﬁeld – a value system that starts in school and continues throughout organizational behavior.
Uncertainty avoidance: The dimension Uncertainty Avoidance has to do with the way that a society deals with the fact that the future can never be known:
should we try to control the future or just let it happen? This ambiguity brings with it anxiety and different cultures have learnt to deal with this anxiety in
different ways. The extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and have created beliefs and institutions that
try to avoid these is reﬂected in the UAI score.
Pragmatism: The extent to which people show a pragmatic or future-oriented perspective rather than a normative or short-term point of view.
Indulgence: The extent to which people try to control their desires and impulses. Relatively weak control is called “Indulgence” and relatively strong
control is called “Restraint”.
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